
Aims By the end of this chapter you should:
1. Appreciate the different approaches that are possible to
religious questions understand some of the arguments for and against
the existence of God, and have some insight into the debate which is
generated by competing claims
2. Understand the role of faith and belief in the context of
religious knowledge
3. Be able to justify a personal position on the question of the
existence of God.
Introduction
In any search for truth, the issue of religion will arise as some
point. You may have already seen that religious values, or lack of
them, permeate our thinking about many issues, and MOST people
naturally feel a deep personal interest in the whole question of
God. There may be people who are indifferent to the possibility of
God's existence; if so I have never come across them. And it would
be strange to be indifferent to an area of knowledge which claims to
explain the nature of right and wrong, the purpose of life and what
happens to us after death. What more important and exciting
questions can there be? Although religious questions are asked
universally (every single culture throughout history has, as far as
we know, had the concept of one or more deities), there have been no
universally accepted answers. Opinions vary from atheism (the belief
that there is no God), to theism (the belief that there is one God),
to polytheism (the belief in several gods), to pantheism (the belief
that the Universe is God), and agnosticism (the lack of belief one
way or another), and within each 'ism' there are numerous, sometimes
strongly conflicting, beliefs. A full investigation is more than we
can offer here — instead we focus on the most commonly held belief,
namely that there is one omnipotent, benevolent and personal God who
takes an active interest in humanity, and ask the central questions:
Is there a God? How can we know? Before we even start to answer the
questions, we find that we are already in controversy. The
philosopher A. J. Ayer dismissed the whole concept as meaningless,
since 'no sentence which purports to describe the nature of a god
can possess any literal significance'. (Ayer was a logical
positivist, which meant that he would only accept as meaningful
statements which could be verified by empirical evidence. The
logical positivists' approach is now regarded by most as extreme and
fairly barren.) Similarly, in the eighteenth century, David Hume
suggested that rational inquiry can play no part in religious
matter. Of the whole concept of divinity, he wrote, 'Commit it then
to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion.' It will come as no surprise that many believers have
accused this sort of philosopher of monstrous conceit and have
suggested that it is philosophy, or in extreme cases, philosophers,
who should be cast into the fire! St Attgustine's view was that
humans must rely on God, not reason, to guide them to the truth, and
in cc response to the 'stupefying arrogance' of philosophers who
believed they could work out the great questions without an appeal
to God, wrote 'What sort of an awareness of truth is there in this
material flesh?' Those are the extreme views. These days most people
would agree that there is a middle ground between philosophy and
religion; certainly it would be foolish to dismiss the possibility
out of hand. Arguing that both faith and reason are divine gifts,
the great Christian philosopher St Thomas Aquinas rejected the idea
of an inherent conflict between them. He saw them as complementary,
even harmonious tools with which to study God. The Prophet Muhammad
expressed a similar sentiment when he said 'God has not created
anything better than reason, or anything more perfect or more
beautiful than reason.' This whole course is based on the principle
that we need to maintain an open mind and to try to apply honest
reasoning where we can. Let us therefore see how far reasoning will
take us, and lilt proves to be an insufficient tool then let us
recognise that and examine the alternatives.
A What are your religious beliefs (if any)? Do you know why you
believe what you do? Is it a set of beliefs (or lack of beliefs) you
have come to yourself, or one that you have absorbed from your
culture unquestioningly? B Do you believe that reasoning should play
a part in determining religious beliefs? C Look at the different
meanings of 'exist' in the following sentences: • Trees exist. •
Pain exists. • Protons exist. 111 Dinosaurs exist. El Dragons exist.
M Energy exists. 01 Ghosts exist. U Love exists. Which statement is
most like 'God exists'? D Would any of the following demonstrate the
existence of a God? IS If believers lived on average 25 years longer
than atheists. • If prayers of believers were answered. 1/1 If
children started to quote the Holy Book as soon as they learned to
talk. If believers were more successful in life than atheists. O If
believers could perform miracles. 10 If believers after death were
seen to fly up into the sky and disappear. Can you think of any
empirical test that would prove that God existed?
Many brilliant thinkers have argued passionately that God exists;
many have argued that He does not. Some of the arguments have been
debated for the best part of 800 years, and still inspire new
defences and counter-attacks from both sides. We will review some of
the more popular arguments and then stand back and take stock of
what, if anything, we can conclude.
The fool hath said in his heart 'There is no God.'
Book of Psalms 14.1
Imagine you are walking in a sandy desert, miles from civilisation,
through what xou believe is completely uninhabited land. There have
been no signs of human life for days; just sand in all directions,
and the odd camel. Suddenly, in the distance, something small and
shiny on the ground catches the light; you walk over to it and you
find a camera. You were sure that there were no humans in the area,
so you have two options. Either you were wrong, and the camera was
put there by humans, or it somehow sprang into being by some
mysterious, purely natural forces. Which choice is the more
reasonable? In this case, we clearly require human intervention
(neglecting the camel possibility) because the camera could not have
come into being in an accidental way. The lens exactly fits the
camera body, the shutter opens for exactly the right length of time
to create a detailed image on the film, the film is itself a very
clever way of recording visual images, and there is a viewfinder
lens for humans to look through to see the image they are recording.
In short, the camera shows unmistakable signs of design, and what is
more, design for human use. For many people, exactly the same
argument applies to the world. It is clearly designed, so there must
be a designer, and God is that designer. In fact, the argument
arguably applies with far more force. You think a camera is complex?
Look at the eye! Look at the brain! A single human brain is the most
complex physical structure known to man, far, far more complex than
the most sophisticated supercomputer. If a camera is designed,
surely a brain must be designed? For many people, the argument from
design, or teleological argument (from Greek telos meaning 'goal' or
'end'), means that a compelling argument in favour of God's
existence is all around them. It is in the intricacy, beauty and
design of the natural world. The most famous counter-argument
against this proof comes from Charles Darwin, and in essence it is
very simple (note though, that it is an argument against the
teleological argument, not an argument against the existence of
God). Darwin makes a distinction between the concepts of order and
design, suggesting that not everything which shows order must have
been designed. As an example, consider walking along a river. You
notice that as you walk further, the rocks in the river seem to be
getting bigger; that the river is well-ordered in this respect. But
no designer is needed to explain this ordering, and the whole
process is completely and convincingly explained by geographical
theories of fluvial transportation and deposition — sorting rocks of
different sizes is simply the result of natural physical processes.
Similarly, Darwin argues that we can explain the order in nature
through purely physical processes; that a designer is unnecessary.
This means that we can account for the world without God, and that
the apparent design of the world is no evidence for a creator. Of
course, the order in the natural world is far greater than that in a
single river and Darwin's basic idea needs a lot of detailed work
before it becomes convincing, but most, though not all, scientists
working in biological fields believe that the evidence for it is
convincing. One variety of the argument from design that is at least
partly immune to Darwin's criticisms goes by the name of the
anthropic argument. This argument notes from a scientific point of
view that very slight changes in any one of several aspects of the
Universe would have made it impossible for us to exist, or even have
evolved. If the Earth were a little closer or further away from the
Sun; if the atmosphere were a little thinner; if the Sun were hotter
or cooler; if the structure of water were a little different; if the
electron/proton or neutron/proton mass ratios were different; if the
ratios between the four fundamental forces were different; if there
were different numbers of spatial dimensions and so on, we would not
exist. All these and dozens of other conditions must be fulfilled
for us to be able to survive or evolve. What is the probability of
that happening? Extremely low runs the argument, and this provides
evidence that we are not here by pure chance. Astronomer Fred Hoyle
said that it looks as if 'someone has been monkeying with the laws
of physics'. Others argue that the logic is incorrect; given that we
are here, it is absolutely certain that these things are the way
they are. If they were not, we would not be here, and it is a trick
of conditional probability that it appears unlikely.
A The following argument has been made against Darwin's idea of
evolution: The human body is vastly more complex than a jumbo jet.
But we say that 'natural events' led to humans. Well, could natural
events lead to even a jumbo jet? Could a natural event like a
whirlwind sweep through a scrap yard and somehow assemble all the
parts for a jumbo. ready for take-off? If not, then natural events
can neither account for jumbo jets nor humans. Evaluate the validity
of this analogy. B Augustine of Hippo, the fifth-century bishop and
philosopher, anticipated Darwin by well over a thousand years,
suggesting that God created the Universe with built-in organising
principles through which all forms of life and non-life developed.
So is evolution consistent with belief in God? What would scientists
today make of Augustine's claim? C What do you think of the
anthropic argument? Is it persuasive? D Let us grant the argument
from design its full force, and accept that the Universe was indeed
designed. What can we conclude from this fact? Are we inevitably led
to the existence of an omnipotent, benevolent God, or could God be
of a completely different nature?
A second argument often put forward in favour of God's existence has
been called the argument from first cause, or the cosmological
argument. Like the argument from design, it is based in everyday
experience. When we ask 'Why did this happen?' we always feel there
is a cause, even if we cannot find it. And when we have found the
cause, we can, like the proverbial curious child, ask why that
happened, and so on. For example, in attempting to answer the
question, 'What causes the stars to twinkle?', we can imagine a
(very truncated) sequence which starts 'stars twinkle because the
light comes through the atmosphere; coming through the atmosphere
causes twinkling because of the process of refraction; refraction is
caused by ...' and which eventually ends '... because that is the
way the Universe is made'. In any explanation we either keep on
going, or we stop somewhere, and this argument suggests that the
somewhere is God. Most famously stated by Thomas Aquinas, this
argument can be expressed in the following logical form: I Every
event is caused by some event prior to it. 2 Either the series of
causes is infinite, or it stops with a first cause which is itself
uncaused. 3 An infinite series of causes is impossible. 4 Therefore
a first cause, which is uncaused and which is God, must exist.
This common-sense approach has also been subject to stinging
criticism from David Hume, who we have by now seen several times
before, and who disputed 1, 3 and 4. Hume thought that 3 is simply
false, that it is another example of limited human understanding,
and the need to impose human order on the Universe. If we can
conceive of an infinite future, why not an infinite past? It is not
logically or empirically clear why 2 should be true, so we should
not accept it. He also argues that even if 1, 2 and 3 are true, why
does this lead to God? Couldn't the Universe have created itself,
uncaused? A related difficulty lies in the contradictory nature of
the argument. Premise 1 seems to rule out the possibility of
anything uncaused at all, which would rule out God immediately.
Recent attempts have been made to defend Aquinas against these
charges, and it is fair to say that, despite flume's penetrating
comments, debate is still alive and well in some philosophical
quarters.
A Current scientific theory suggests that the Universe began in a
'big bang several billion years ago. It also suggests that some
events on the quantum-mechanical scale are genuinely uncaused. Are
either of these facts evidence for or against the argument from
first cause? B What do you think of part 2 of Aquinas' argument? Is
it possible to imagine an infinite past? Is this harder to conceive
of than an infinite future? If so, why? C Some have argued that
trying to find the first cause is like trying to find the smallest
positive number — a meaningless task. Given any number (state of the
Universe), you can always find a smaller number (earlier cause) but
you can never find the smallest number (first cause) because there
is no such thing. This is obvious when you think of a number line —
no matter how close you get to zero, you can always 'zoom in and get
closer. Is this a helpful analogy? Is it possible to imagine that
every single event has a cause, but that there is no first event? D
Let us grant the first cause argument its full force, and concede
that the Universe was indeed caused by God. What can we conclude
from this fact? Are we inevitably led to the existence of an
omnipotent, benevolent God, or are there other first causes equally
consistent with design?
The final argument we shall consider, and one that has had great
popular appeal over the centuries, is the argument from miracles.
According to this argument, miraculous happenings throughout
history, such as Jesus rising from the dead, milk flowing from a
stone statue of Ganesh, or sudden remissions of deadly diseases, are
evidence of divine intervention because only God could cause such
things to happen. Like the other two arguments, there is something
very appealing about this line of thinking — some events seem so
incredibly unlikely, implausible, or even impossible for humans,
that some sort of divine agency must be responsible. However, Like
the other (WO arguments, there are problems. Firstly, let us
consider exactly what we mean by a miracle. Presumably it must be
something which cannot be explained by an natural or scientific
laws, so in this context we do not mean such miracles as the
'miracle of birth', wonderful and awe-inspiring as this may be, as
it requires no divine intervention. Most physical and biological
processes are reasonably well understood and there is every
indication that those which are not will be explained by careful and
painstaking scientific investigation. No, a miracle must be
something which is beyond scientific explanation. Suppose, for
example. I find that my cup of water has turned into wine. What can
I make of this? Is it a miracle? It certainly seems to be
unaccounted for by the known laws of nature, but that may well be
because we don't know the correct laws of nature. In past times,
thunder and lightning were explained with reference to gods — they
were thought to be miraculous. Now we believe otherwise. In the late
nineteenth century, it was found that photographic plates kept in
total darkness became exposed. At the time this was inexplicable,
but in fact this 'miraculous' incident opened up the whole field of
radioactivity to scientific study. To invoke God as the explanation
for events which are not explained by science is possible (the
God-of-the-gaps approach), but this inference is vulnerable to
advances in knowledge. It could be said that some events seem not
only miraculous, but take place in such contexts that natural laws
must be inadequate to explain them. For example, the Bible recounts
that the sound of Joshua's trumpet caused the walls of Jericho to
fall, and the Sun to stop still in the sky for several hours. By any
account, this would have to be a miracle; how could the laws of
science link a trumpet call with the motion of the Sun? If the story
is true, even the most fervent atheist would have to admit that this
is a good case for divine intervention. But is it true? We were not
at Jericho at the crucial time. How can we know? In On Miracles,
David Hume, writes that when we listen to stories of such miracles,
we should weigh up two possibilities. Firstly, that the account is
genuine and the event is indeed miraculous; secondly, that those
making the report are deluded, credulous, dr dishonest and that the
event is not miraculous. This approach may seem rather brutal, but
it would be foolish and simply incorrect to suggest that lying,
exaggeration and gullibility are even rare, let alone miraculous:
No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the
testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more
miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establisk So which
is the snore likely? There are no prizes for guessing where Hume
stands on the matter, but what do you think? Hume argues that some
deception is far more likely than a miracle, but it could be said
that he is open to the charge of circularity. We do not know the
likelihood of a miracle happening — if we did, then their occurrence
would not be in dispute (a zero probability means miracles never
happen; any other probability confirms the possibility of their
occurrence). So how do we evaluate the probability? This question
clearly illustrates the paradigmatic nature of religion — if we are
atheists then the probability is zero, bus if we are theists then
the probability may, depending on our particular beliefs, be
reasonably high. Under some circumstances then, by Home's own
account we may feel that the miracle is the better explanation,
especially if the source is very trustworthy. Perhaps all we can say
is that the argument from miracles is hardly likely to win converts
from atheism, and conversely, the problem of miracles is hardly a
problem for any theist! Despite these issues, it is probably fair to
say that if certain miracles were to be reliably witnessed at first
hand, even the most zealous atheists would need to re-examine heir
beliefs, but that these miracles have not (yet?) happened. If
someone appeared to us, telling us that he was God, with the ability
to repeatedly perform under scrutiny such 'impossible' things as
changing water into wine, reading minds, and predicting the future
publicly, precisely, and unambiguously, then many would say that the
claim was a strong one. The existence of God could still be avoided
in several ways, but these ways would also be problematic.
A Sometimes scientists are accused of arrogance because they believe
that science has all the answers. How does this relate to the notion
of miracles as being beyond the realm of science? B Even if we grant
the difficult-to-satisfy criterion that an event must be
inexplicable by science, where does that get us? Does an event that
is 'inexplicable by science' necessitate divine intervention? C The
science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke wrote that any sufficiently
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic'. Do you agree?
What implication does this have for the argument from miracles? D In
Home's critique, we are required to assess the probability of a
miracle. How do we do that? What are the problems with Hume's
argument?
This is by no means a complete catalogue of the rational arguments
which attempt to support the existence of God, nor an exhaustive
report of the subtlety, complexity or richness to which they can be
taken, They do, however, give a flavour of the genre and should
inspire further research for the interested. We now turn to the
arguments offered in the other direction.
Your Highness, I have no need of this hypothesis. Pierre Simon de
Laplace (to Napoleon on why his works on celestial mechanics make no
mention of God)
The most extreme defence of atheism has been to claim that it needs
no defence. The thrust of this argument is that the existence of God
is like the existence of Father Christmas — the notion is so
far-fetched and lacking in rational or empirical basis that our base
position should be that of atheism, and that the burden of proof is
on the theist. This sort of statement, which is arguably circular
and certainly more aggressive than persuasive in nature, goes to
demonstrate that the whole role of argument within the religious
context is sometimes so clouded in emotion on both sides of the
divide that rational discussion is difficult. This sort of argument
is made when the speaker is less interested in the truth than in
scoring rhetorical points, and since it is the former which
interests us here, we shall go ahead and examine theism for
strengths and weaknesses. The first argument against the existence
of God is based around a set of questions which are collectively
known as the paradoxes of omnipotence. Proponents argue that these
paradoxes demonstrate that the very concept of an omnipotent God is
inconsistent and hence impossible. The argument is quite radical as
it claims to demonstrate not only that there is no God, but that
there could not be a God, just as there could not be a square circle
or a married bachelor.
The questions are those such as:
1 Can God make a stone so heavy he cannot lift it? 2 Can God make
himself omnipotent and not omnipotent at the same time? 3 Can God
create another omnipotent being? 4 Can God cease to be omnipotent?
You can immediately see the problems — 2 seems downright absurd, and
no matter how you answer the others there seems to be some limit
placed on God's power.
2 if God can't make such a stone then there is something He cannot
do (make the stone) and so He is not omnipotent; if He can make a
stone that He cannot lift then there is something He cannot do (lift
the stone) and so He is not omnipotent. Either way we have a
dilemma. Responses to these have been to either engage them directly
or to acknowledge their force but to deny their relevance. We will
turn to the latter tactic in the next section; for now let us see
what we can do to resolve the paradoxes. Many have said that these
objections have something of a word game nature to them and suggest
that none of these questions generate paradox when looked at
correctly. In the stone case, for example, to say that 'God cannot
create a stone which is too heavy to move' is a direct and harmless
consequence of 'God can create and move stones of any weight at
all.' In case 4 a common response is to say that God cannot cease to
be omnipotent any more than He can cease to exist, but that this
inability is not a contradiction of His omnipotence but an
expression of it.